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The long-term 
trend toward 
increasing 
complexity 
combined with a 
waning faith in 
multilateralism 
and multilateral 
institutions 
makes it nearly 
impossible to 
reach traditional 
binding 
multilateral 
accords.
Introduction: Coping with Complexity
Last December, the eyes of all those with a 
stake in international affairs turned to Europe  
First they looked to Geneva, for signs that the 
long-running Doha Round of multilateral trade 
negotiations at the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) would get back on track after years of 
stalemate  Then observers turned to Copenhagen, 
hoping to see a binding and comprehensive 
agreement reflecting a commitment on the part of 
the world’s governments to address the pressing 
global challenge of climate change  They were to 
be sorely disappointed  Inscribed on the faces of 
those struggling to reach agreements was a deep 
frustration with multilateral processes that were 
proving incapable of delivery  Instead of agreement, 
the images playing out on television screens and in 
newspapers around the world were of fractiousness 
and division, due in part to the large number of 
participants and contentiousness of the issues 
faced; of anger, on the part of all those who felt 
marginalized by the process; and of concern, from 
those looking for signs that the world still has the 
capacity to reach accords when it really matters 
The failure of these meetings to produce formal 
agreements—or even specific paths to reaching 
agreements in the future—despite the high stakes 
and the political capital that had been invested in 
advance left many questioning the ability of the 
world’s leaders to meet global challenges, shedding 
a spotlight on the institutions and fora that were 
established for the purpose of achieving multilateral 
solutions to the most pressing collective problems 
of the 21st century 
Why did these meetings fail? Many had assumed 
that the most significant economic crisis since the 
Great Depression and the overwhelming scientific 
and circumstantial evidence of damaging changes 
to our climate would compel world leaders to 
set aside their differences and reach meaningful 
agreements  But it did not happen  It is not that the 
problems are not big enough or urgent enough  The 
failure to reach agreements can best be seen as part 
of a long-term trend toward increased complexity 
in the world that makes it nearly impossible to 
reach traditional multilateral binding accords, 
combined with a waning of faith on the part of 
many countries in multilateralism and multilateral 
institutions  
This increased complexity stems from a number 
of seismic shifts in international relations—and 
especially in international economic relations—
some of which have been unfolding over the 
course of decades while others are of more recent 
origin  Government policies and international 
arrangements for collective decision-making 
have not kept pace with changes in the world, 
especially the high degree of international 
economic integration and interdependence  With 
decolonization came increases in the number of 
countries who are players on the world stage as 
well as a rebalancing of global economic power that 
has continued with the rise of the BRICs (Brazil, 
Russia, India, and China) and the other emerging 
market economies  The collapse of the Soviet 
bloc, accompanied by market reforms in China 
and India in the 1980s and 1990s accelerated the 
rapid integration of the global economy  Where 
previously only about half the world’s population—
the Oraganisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) countries, plus parts of 
Latin America and Asia—were engaged in global 
economic activity, suddenly people everywhere 
were brought together in a single world economy 
based on capitalism and markets  
At the macro-level, this led to shifting trade 
flows and patterns of foreign direct investment, 
a rise in the number and size of multinational 
companies and financial institutions, and surging 
global demand  It also meant a corresponding 
increase in the speed with which goods, 
money, and technology traverse the globe  At 
the micro-level, the “great doubling” of the 
1
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The inability 
to create new 
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means greater 
reliance on—and 
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of—the existing 
international 
economic 
institutions, the 
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global workforce has had a direct effect on 
wages, income levels, and employment in the 
advanced industrial countries, in some instances 
prompting fears of economic insecurity and 
a public backlash against “globalization ”1 
Taken together, all these factors have stretched the 
capacity of the current institutions of multilateral 
governance to a breaking point, leading to 
fragmentation and the emergence of deep divisions 
among groups of countries at different stages of 
economic development  Throw in the increases 
in the complexity of the issues themselves and the 
degree to which these issues overlap and affect one 
another and the problems of the 21st century begin 
to look too complex to handle  
This paper argues that learning to operate in this 
vastly more complex world will require more 
multilateralism, not less  It means greater reliance 
than ever on those economic institutions and 
fora that have already learned to function in a 
global fashion—particularly the World Bank, 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the 
WTO  It contends that creating new international 
institutions or binding accords is nearly impossible 
in today’s world, and examines where the existing 
institutions stand today and the changes that will be 
necessary if they are to form the core of an effective 
global economic architecture for the 21st century  
Secondly, the paper explores the problems created 
by the lack of faith in multilateralism, particularly 
on the part of many developing and emerging 
market countries, who either don’t want to rely on 
the multilateral institutions designed in a bygone 
era when the transatlantic powers dominated the 
world or who find that their economic needs can be 
more easily addressed through bilateral or regional 
agreements rather than working through the often 
1 Richard B  Freeman, America Works: Critical Thoughts on the 
Exceptional U.S. Labor Market (Russell Sage Foundation, 2007) 
more cumbersome processes at the multilateral 
level  Despite a new multilateralist president in 
the United States, the momentum in the world of 
global governance today is in the wrong direction, 
to be found in the hundreds of regional, sub-
regional, and bilateral agreements that have come 
into force in the last several decades  With each 
such agreement comes a lessening of the energy, 
time, and resources left for multilateralism and 
multilateral institutions—along with the hard fact 
that the toughest global problems thus remain on 
the table, unsolved and insoluble through such 
regional arrangements  
Third, the paper contends that, in the absence of 
any prospect of building a new global economic 
architecture, the existing institutions of multilateral 
economic governance must be “renovated ” Their 
governance structures need to be changed to reflect 
the dramatic shifts in the distribution of economic 
weight among countries, their mandates revised 
in order to ensure that they cover a wider range of 
issues but with better coherence among them, and 
they must be adapted in the face of proliferating 
regionalism, with a shift toward accommodating 
and incorporating regional accords within 
multilateral frameworks  
This paper also contends that while these changes 
are both daunting and essential if the institutions 
are to have the efficiency, effectiveness, and 
legitimacy they require, they are in fact well within 
the grasp of the current world system  We are 
not, in other words, in “a 1944 moment”—the 
constitution-making epoch when the United 
Nations, along with the World Bank, the IMF, and 
the predecessors to the WTO were created largely 
out of whole cloth  Nor do we need to be in such 
a moment in order to achieve a global economic 
architecture capable of meeting the needs of 
the 21st century  The current crisis, the coming 
together of world leaders through the elevation 
of the G20, and a common understanding of the 
Saving Multilateralism 
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failings of the current international economic 
institutions ought to be enough to compel these 
much-needed renovations of the system  
Finally, although leadership will be needed 
from countries all around the world, the paper 
concludes by suggesting the role that Europe 
and the United States must play if they are to 
help save what together they started 65 years 
ago—the institutions of a multilateral economic 
order created to bring about global peace and 
prosperity for all, with a commitment to think 
and act globally when addressing the most 
pressing economic problems of the day 
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The UN bore 
responsibility 
for issues of 
diplomacy, 
security, and war; 
the World Bank 
for international 
development and 
the reduction 
of poverty; the 
International 
Monetary Fund for 
financial stability 
and economic 
cooperation; 
and the GATT, 
precursor to 
the World Trade 
Organization, for 
trade liberalization 
and institutional 
stability in the 
world trading 
system.
In 1944, in the woods of New Hampshire, with 
the end of World War II already in sight, an 
extraordinary set of gatherings occurred, bringing 
together an array of government officials whose 
vision for a better future was shaped by the hard 
lessons of the 1930s  Rejecting the catastrophic 
“beggar-thy-neighbor” policies of the major 
economic powers that had hastened the slide 
into worldwide depression and war, these public 
servants dedicated themselves instead to the 
creation of a rules-based international economic 
order that would serve as the basis for peace and 
prosperity  Over the course of the Bretton Woods 
Conference, the subsequent Dumbarton Oaks 
and San Francisco meetings, and the months 
that followed, they conceived of and created the 
charters for four major international institutions—
the United Nations (UN), the International Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development (World 
Bank), the International Monetary Fund, and the 
International Trade Organization (ITO) 2
At their inception, each of the major international 
institutions played specified roles  The UN bore 
responsibility for issues of diplomacy, security, and 
war; the World Bank for international development 
and the reduction of poverty; the International 
Monetary Fund for financial stability and economic 
cooperation; and the GATT, precursor to the World 
Trade Organization, for trade liberalization and 
institutional stability in the world trading system 
These institutions, while far from perfect, have 
done much to accomplish their most fundamental 
goals  In light of the tremendous pressure from 
around the world to protect domestic markets 
2 The UN, IBRD (World Bank) and IMF all came into being 
with little delay  However, attempts to launch the ITO with a 
broad mandate had to be abandoned in 1951 when the Truman 
Administration announced that it would not seek ratification of 
the Havana Charter due to lack of support in the U S  Congress  
Instead, in 1947 a smaller group of countries negotiated the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which was 
transformed in 1995 into the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
and jobs, the GATT/WTO and its rules and 
disciplines have kept an outbreak of Depression-
era protectionism at bay for half a century, and 
eight rounds of multilateral trade negotiations 
have resulted in widespread liberalization of 
trade—at least in industrial products among 
industrial countries  The UN, while not achieving 
the ultimate goal of bringing an end to all wars, 
has done much to contain crises, settle regional 
conflicts, man peacekeeping missions, eradicate 
diseases, and work out agreements on everything 
from human rights conventions to the use of the 
seabed and of outer space  Similarly, the World 
Bank, while not eliminating poverty, has seen 
the portion of the world’s population living in 
poverty decline from 40 percent 20 years ago to 
21 percent today, along with providing loans and 
development assistance in more than 126 countries 
and participating in initiatives on everything 
from combating HIV/AIDS to biodiversity to 
education and debt relief for the poorest countries  
The Bank is rightfully commended for its ability 
to raise and channel resources for development, 
for its highly-trained staff, and for its depth of 
knowledge about development strategies and 
approaches across country boundaries 3 The 
IMF, while it has evolved considerably from its 
initial days of monitoring adherence to the par 
value system of fixed exchange rates, has made 
important changes to its key instruments—
surveillance, lending, and technical assistance—
allowing it to contain a number of financial crises, 
continue concessional lending where necessary, 
and join the fight against extreme poverty 4
3 “Repowering the World Bank for the 21st Century ” Report of 
the High-Level Commission on Modernization of World Bank 
Group Governance (the “Zedillo Commission Report”), Oct  
2009, p  9 
4 Rodrigo de Rato, former managing director of the IMF took 
the view before the 2008-2009 financial crisis that fundamental 
reform to the IMF was not needed, arguing that the IMF 
had evolved over its 60 years through amendments to its key 
instruments while remaining true to its purposes of fostering 
international economic cooperation, promoting rising prosperity 
and safeguarding global financial stability  Rodrigo de Rato, “Is 
the IMF’s Mandate Still Relevant?” Global Agenda, Jan  2005 
Solid Foundations: The Architecture of 
Global Economic Governance2
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For their part, the United States and the member 
states of the European Union have been among 
the most active and engaged participants in 
these institutions  This is unsurprising, given 
the role the transatlantic partners played in 
creating these institutions and the interests they 
were originally intended to serve  At bottom, 
the postwar global economic architecture was 
established as a means to tie the West together 
in the emerging Cold War context through the 
liberalization of international trade and capital 
flows  First through the institutions of the Bretton 
Woods system, and then through the Marshall 
Plan, the United States was able to rebuild the 
shattered production capacity and financial 
markets of Western Europe  For the United States, 
the overriding purpose was clear: the political-
strategic need to build up a bulwark against 
Table 1. The architecture of global economic governance
International Monetary Fund 
(IMF)
World Bank World Trade Organization (WTO)
Began with: 44 members
Now: 186 Members
Began with: 44 members
Now: 186 Members
Began with: 23 GATT parties
Now: 153 Members
Mandate:
•  Promotes international 
monetary cooperation
•  Macroeconomic surveillance
•  Promotes exchange stability
•  Develops multilateral 
system of payments
•  Makes resources available 
to member’s experiencing 
balance of payments 
difficulties.
Mandate:
•  Evolved from facilitator of 
post-war reconstruction and 
development to mandate of 
worldwide poverty alleviation
•  Promotes long-term 
economic development 
by providing technical and 
financial support
•  Funds loans through 
member country 
contributions and bond 
issuance 
Mandate:
•  Forum for trade negotiations
•  Handles trade disputes 
through dispute settlement 
process 
•  Monitors and implements 
trade agreements
•  Technical assistance and 
training for developing 
countries
•  Cooperation with other 
international organizations
Revenue: $325 billion in quotas 
contributed by members (as of 
3/09)
Revenue: In 2009, IBRD raised 
$44.3 billion. In FY 09–11, 
commitments of $41.7 billion 
made available to IDA
Revenue: Administrative 
budget of $173 million, paid 
by contributions from members 
based on a share of world trade
Loans or grants: $175.5 billion 
in loans committed, of which 
$124.5 billion not drawn (as of 
9/09)
Loans or grants: $58.8 billion 
in total commitments (loans, 
credits, guarantees, and grants) 
in 2009
Loans or grants: $28 million 
of training and technical 
assistance provided; support for 
Aid for Trade initiatives
Source: IMF, World Bank, WTO websites 
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Communism  But it also served U S  economic 
self-interest: a significant portion of Marshall Plan 
aid effectively went to boost European demand 
for goods from the United States, helping stave 
off domestic fears of a postwar slump or renewal 
of the Great Depression  Over the medium term, 
the Bretton Woods system helped create foreign 
markets for the United States by conjuring up a 
middle class in U S  economic partners around the 
world, something from which the Europeans—
once they were back on their feet following the 
Marshall Plan and the reconstruction program 
of the Organization for European Economic 
Cooperation—have also been able to benefit  
Today, by way of illustration, nearly one-third of 
U S  and EU exports are to developing countries 
where the World Bank has lending programs 
By together establishing the rules and standards of 
conduct by which the global economy is governed, 
the United States and European Union became 
the stewards of the international economic order, 
running the system for much of the postwar 
era  In return, the three pillars of the global 
economic architecture they established—covering 
the financial side of economies (IMF), trade in 
goods and the real side of economies (GATT/
WTO), and international development and 
poverty alleviation (World Bank)—have delivered 
enormous economic benefits to their founders  
Despite occasional challenges, the system has 
fared well  It has provided stability and market 
opening, relatively stable foreign exchange rates, 
the ready availability of capital, and a forum for the 
coordination of macroeconomic policies  Between 
the first GATT round in 1947 and the launch of the 
Doha Round at the WTO in 2001, international 
trade increased enormously, by more than 100 fold  
Global financial flows have grown by a still greater 
amount  The integration of the world economy 
has proceeded apace, propelled by freedom of 
capital movements, the development of new and 
expanding markets, economies of scale, cheaper 
sources of supply of raw materials and finished 
goods, the international migration of labor, and 
technological advances in production processes, 
transportation, and communications 
The legacy of this history is that the United 
States and Europe enjoy outsized control at the 
Bretton Woods institutions  Both benefit from the 
unwritten rule that the president of the World Bank 
is always an American, while the managing director 
of the IMF is always a European  Seven of the top 
ten countries that are “overrepresented” at the IMF 
(in terms of the difference between their IMF quota 
share and their share of world GDP) are European 
Both the World Bank and the IMF have a board of 
24 executive directors, with most of the executive 
directors speaking for (and voting for) a group 
of countries  Five countries, however, have their 
own appointed seats: the United States, Germany, 
France, the United Kingdom, and Japan  In 
addition to the German, French, and British seats, 
the 24 other members of the European Union are 
part of the group of countries represented by seven 
other executive directors, thereby giving Europe 
three exclusive seats and a significant presence in 
seven others  As such, the EU’s member states can 
influence 32 percent of the votes at the IMF—and 
a similar (although not exactly equal) number at 
the World Bank  At the WTO, the United States 
and Europe have traditionally made up two of 
the so-called “quad” countries (the United States, 
European Union, Canada, and Japan) that for a 
long time were viewed as the “dealmakers” for any 
trade agreement, to which the rest of world was 
expected to simply sign on 
The legacy of this 
history is that 
the United States 
and Europe enjoy 
outsized control at 
the Bretton Woods 
institutions.
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Under-represented Countries Over-represented Countries
-6.00 -5.00 -4.00 -3.00 -2.00 -1.00 0.00
China
United States
India
Brazil
Mexico
Turkey
Russia
Iran
Korea
Spain
Indonesia
United Arab Emirates
Poland
New Zealand
Japan
Romania
Thailand
Slovak Republic
Bangladesh
Morocco
Kazakhstan
Greece
Nicaragua
Czech Republic
Colombia
Saudi Arabia
Germany
Belgium
France
Netherlands
United Kingdom
Switzerland
Canada
Venezuela
Sweden
Denmark
Italy
Norway
Austria
Kuwait
Libya
Iraq
Nigeria
Singapore
Finland
Ireland
Malaysia
Chile
Zambia
Algeria
0.00 1.00 2.00
Difference between IMF
Quota Share and Share 
of World GDP (%)
Non-EU States
EU Member States
Figure 1. Under- and over-representation at the International Monetary Fund
Notes: 25 IMF members with the smallest and largest differences between IMF quota share and share of world GDP. GDP is adjusted 
for purchasing power parity (PPP).
Source: Rebecca Nelson, “The G20 and International Economic Cooperation: Background and Implications for Congress,” 
Congressional Research Service, Dec. 9, 2009. 
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With the bursting of the housing bubble in the 
United States in 2007 and the train of events that 
led to the destabilization of the global financial 
system, the world economy collapsed into a 
steep recession in the final quarter of 2008, with 
global real GDP dropping at a 6 percent annual 
rate  This is undoubtedly the sharpest decline in 
world output—and especially in world industrial 
production and world trade—of the postwar era  
Worldwide exports plummeted from $16 1 trillion 
in 2008 to $11 2 trillion in 2009, a drop of over 30 
percent  Virtually all countries were sucked into 
the downturn, with the world witnessing the first 
significant decline in world real GDP (of nearly one 
percent) in six decades 
The full story of why this collapse occurred is 
still being written, but it starts with a focus on 
developments in the United States—especially the 
expansion and subsequent collapse of the real estate 
and real estate financing bubble and its impact on 
an overleveraged U S  and global financial system  
Add to the tale the accounts of persistently easy 
monetary policies, very low interest rates and 
interest rate spreads, and a general disregard of 
growing risks in the financial system, and the key 
causes begin to come into focus  Others would 
point to huge current account savings and reserve 
accumulations in Asia, particularly China, and 
the mirror-image deficits in the United States as 
another major underlying cause of the troubles 
This Great Recession of 2008–2009 has tested the 
international economic institutions as never before  
In response, the IMF has stepped up its role as a 
lender of last resort, providing financial support 
packages to (among others) Iceland, Ukraine, 
Hungary, Pakistan, Belarus, Serbia, Armenia, El 
Salvador, and Latvia, and has also extended credit 
to Mexico, Poland, and Colombia under a new 
flexible credit line  In order to better equip the 
Fund for this task, G20 leaders at their London 
summit in April 2009 pledged to triple the IMF’s 
lending capacity to $750 billion  Additionally, 
they urged the Fund to intensify its economic 
surveillance and early warning systems 
The World Bank has also moved to expand 
and speed up lending, assistance, and advice to 
developing countries, committing a record high of 
nearly $60 billion to countries hit by the financial 
crisis in fiscal year 2009—an increase of 54 percent 
over the previous year  An additional $8 3 billion 
was mobilized as part of the World Bank’s global 
crisis response initiative to lessen the impact of 
the crisis on the most vulnerable, especially in 
low-income countries  These initiatives focus 
on safety net programs to protect the most 
vulnerable, maintaining long-term infrastructure 
investment programs, and on sustaining the 
potential for private sector-led economic growth 
and employment creation, particularly through the 
support of small and medium-size enterprises 
The WTO for its part began a new monitoring 
and reporting mechanism on protectionist actions 
taken by WTO members and worked to ensure 
that markets remained open and that countries 
adhered to their WTO commitments  The WTO 
also pushed G20 members to keep their pledges of 
support for Aid for Trade initiatives and worked to 
ensure that trade finance remained available and 
affordable 
The second major systemic response to the Great 
Recession has been the transformation of the 
little-known G20 gatherings of finance ministers 
and central bankers into an affair involving 
heads of state, declared by these leaders to be 
“the premier forum for international economic 
cooperation ”5 The G20 started in 1999 in the 
wake of the 1997 Asian financial crisis as a forum 
that brought together finance ministers from 
5 The Pittsburg Summit: Leaders’ Statement, paragraph 19  
“We designated the G20 to be the premier forum for our 
international economic cooperation ”
The Great Recession and the Steering 
Committee of the World Economy3
The second 
major systemic 
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major advanced and emerging economies with 
the goal of stabilizing global financial markets  
With its ascendancy as part of the response to the 
Great Recession, it has now supplanted the G7/
G8 meetings as the “chief steering committee of 
the world economy ”6 The inclusion in the G20 
of a number of countries beyond the historical 
G7/G8 grouping no doubt stemmed, at least in 
part, from a recognition of the growing power of 
the emerging market and developing countries, 
who now account for more than 40 percent 
of the world economy  To have any sense of 
legitimacy throughout the world and particularly 
among the emerging market economies, 
expansion of the leadership circle was critical 
However, the initial G20 Leaders Summit, held in 
Washington in November 2008, was something of 
an EU-U S  joint venture  British Prime Minister 
Gordon Brown had been calling for a “Bretton 
Woods II” to completely revise global economic 
governance, and the United States responded by 
promoting the idea of a G20 gathering, elevated 
to the level of heads of state, and extended the 
invitation for an initial meeting in Washington  
European leaders at first exhibited differences of 
viewpoint on this approach, with French President 
Nicolas Sarkozy needing to be convinced of the 
appropriateness of the G20 as a venue, given that 
EU member states hold four of the seven seats (57 
percent) at the G7 but only those same four seats 
plus one for the European Union (25 percent) 
at the G20  But in the end there was acceptance 
of the G20 as the only available forum with the 
scope of membership required to develop ideas, 
reach consensus on their desirability, and work to 
implement them 
6 C  Fred Bergsten, Peterson Institute for International 
Economics, “A Blueprint for Global Leadership in the Twenty-
First Century,” Keynote Speech at the Global Human Resources 
Forum, Seoul, Korea, Nov  4, 2009  
The evolution of the G20 also caused an evolution 
in the European approach to such summits  Efforts 
were made prior to and after each meeting to come 
to a Europe-wide position, with the European 
Council adopting a number of principles for action 
where agreements could be reached—principally 
in the area of enhancing sound regulation and 
reforming the international financial institutions  
The European Commission was given the task of 
developing proposals for comprehensive reform 
of the financial system, which were then endorsed 
by the European Council and urged upon the rest 
of the G20 leaders by European heads of state  
Throughout these efforts, Europe needed to find 
common ground among competing positions, with 
the United Kingdom arguing for more stimulus 
from other governments, Germany emphasizing 
the need to avoid major budget deficits, and France 
pushing for a major clampdown on executive 
compensation and a general tightening of financial 
regulation  The United States joined the United 
Kingdom and Japan in pushing for more stimulus 
from others while initially resisting any shift of 
financial regulatory policy out of the hands of 
national regulators 
What emerged from these G20 summits is fairly 
remarkable—both in terms of the substance of 
the consensus that was reached and in terms of 
the process  Despite starkly differing views on 
how to stimulate economic growth and recovery, 
agreement was reached to pump more than $1 
trillion into the global economy—albeit through 
the IMF, rather than individual countries—in the 
form of $500 billion in new lending capacity, $250 
billion in new Special Drawing Rights, and $250 
billion in trade finance  Separately, the G20 asserted 
that commitments by individual countries for fiscal 
expansion would total $5 trillion over two years  
Demands from some European countries for a 
major toughening of the regulation and oversight of 
financial institutions were met through the creation 
The inclusion 
in the G20 of 
a number of 
countries beyond 
the historical 
G7/G8 grouping 
partly stems from 
a recognition 
of the growing 
power of the 
emerging market 
and developing 
countries, who 
now account for 
more than 40 
percent of the 
world economy.
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G20 member countries
EU countries not 
individually represented 
in G20
Not members of G7
Legend
G7 member countries
Not members of G7
Legend
Table 2. Numbers count: From the G7/G8 to the G20
G20/G20 + non G8 EU
Country GDP (millions 
of dollars)*
% of world 
GDP
Argentina 324,767 0.53%
Australia 1,013,461 1.66%
Brazil 1,572,839 2.58%
China 4,327,448 7.10%
India 1,206,684 1.98%
Indonesia 511,765 0.84%
Mexico 1,088,128 1.79%
Saudi Arabia 469,426 0.77%
South Africa 276,764 0.45%
South Korea 929,124 1.53%
Turkey 729,983 1.20%
Subtotal 12,450,389 20.44%
G20 total 46,512,592 76.35%
EU (27)1 18,387,785 30.18%
G20 + non-G8 
EU countries2 
53,366,428 87.60%
1 EU 27: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, 
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, 
United Kingdom. 
2 Non-G8 EU members: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, 
Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden. 
Source: G20 website; www.g20.org 
G20 Members
G7/G8
Country GDP (millions 
of dollars)*
% of world 
GDP
Canada 1,499,551 2.46%
France 2,866,951 4.71%
Germany 3,673,105 6.03%
Italy 2,313,893 3.80%
Japan 4,910,692 8.06%
United 
Kingdom
2,680,000 4.40%
United States 14,441,425 23.71%
G7 32,385,617 53.16%
Russia 1,676,586 2.75%
G8 34,062,203 55.92%
EU countries 
in G8
11,533,949 18.93%
* 2008 GDP 
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook Database (Oct. 2009)
G7 Members
Source: G20 website; www.g20.org 
EU G8: France, Germany, Italy, United Kingdom.
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of a Financial Stability Board (FSB) 7 The FSB 
was designed to bring about greater coordination 
and coverage of regulatory systems to include 
hedge funds, principles on pay and compensation, 
controls on excessive bank leverage and bank 
secrecy, and oversight of accounting standards and 
credit rating agencies  Those calling for a “Bretton 
Woods II” and a revamping of the institutions of 
multilateral economic governance were met at 
least halfway: there was eventual agreement on the 
U S  proposal to increase the IMF quota share of 
the emerging market countries by five percentage 
points, along with an increase in the voting power 
of developing and transition countries at the World 
Bank of at least three percent and a commitment 
to reform the “mandates, scope and governance” of 
7 The Financial Stability Board was established at the London 
G20 Summit as a successor to the Financial Stability Forum, 
which was created in 1999 by the G7 finance ministers and 
central bankers as a forum to promote coordination and 
information exchange among those responsible for financial 
stability  The FSF was made up of financial regulators from the 
G7 countries, Australia, Hong Kong, Netherlands, Singapore, 
and Switzerland, as well as international financial institutions, 
international regulatory and supervisory groupings, committees 
of central bank experts and the European Central Bank  
When the G20 leaders transformed the FSF into the FSB, they 
expanded its membership to include 64 participants—all G20 
countries, plus Hong Kong SAR, the Netherlands, Singapore, 
Spain, Switzerland, the European Central Bank, and the 
European Commission  They also significantly expanded 
its mandate to include assessments of vulnerabilities in the 
financial system, monitoring market developments, advising 
on best practices in meeting regulatory standards and the 
establishment of guidelines and support for supervisory 
colleges  U S  Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner described 
the FSB as “a fourth pillar to the architecture of cooperation 
established after the second world war” referring to the 
IMF, the World Bank and the WTO, noting his expectation 
that the FSB will set high global financial standards and 
hold all FSB members accountable to those standards 
the financial institutions, while Europe’s desire to 
keep the number of seats on the Executive Boards 
of the IMF and the World Bank at 24 was met  The 
WTO was included in the later G20 meetings, and 
was given the task of monitoring G20 pledges not 
to take any protectionist action and to complete the 
Doha Round of trade negotiations 8
A pattern began to emerge from the G20 summits 
whereby the heads of state would assign tasks to 
the multilateral economic institutions related to 
specific issues, with instructions to report back 
to the next meeting of G20 leaders  While the 
response to the initial Washington summit was not 
impressive, with markets around the world falling 
significantly after its conclusion, as the actions 
by the multilateral institutions and governments 
to carry out their assigned tasks started to take 
shape, the reaction to the subsequent summits 
was much more positive  Also of interest is the 
emerging process by which disagreements among, 
for example, major European players like Germany, 
France, and the United Kingdom, or between 
Europe and the United States, were brokered by 
other G20 members, with India or China or Brazil 
serving this role of referee and conciliator 
8 The WTO’s scarce resources and prescribed impartiality places 
strong constraints on its ability to effectively name and shame 
members for adopting protectionist measures  A number of 
independent monitors, most prominently Global Trade Alert 
(GTA), www globaltradealert org, have stepped in to analyze 
protectionist measures using a much broader definition of what 
constitutes a protectionist action  With regard to the G20 pledge 
to “refrain from raising new barriers to investment or to trade 
in goods and services,” GTA found that, “on average, a G20 
member had broken the no-protectionism pledge every three 
days” in the year following the Washington Leaders Summit 
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Table 3. G20 leaders summits: Pledges and commitments
G20 Leaders 
Summits
Pledges/Commitments
Washington,  
November 2008
• Adopted 5 principles for reform relating to transparency, accountability, and enhanced 
regulation of financial markets, products, and participants, including credit rating agencies, 
with an action plan for their implementation
• Pledged to coordinate regulatory reforms internationally 
• Committed to reform Bretton Woods Institutions to reflect changed economic weights in the 
world economy, but no specifics 
• Pledged to use expansionary macroeconomic policies, both fiscal and monetary, to stimulate 
aggregate demand and encourage economic growth 
• Committed to refrain from protectionist trade policies and to “strive” to reach agreement on 
the Doha Round of WTO talks.
London,  
April 2009
• Reiterated commitments of 2008
• Creation of Financial Stability Board (FSB) as successor to Financial Stability Forum with all 
G20 countries, FSF members, Spain and the European Commission as FSB members, set up 
to establish and enforce high global standards for financial regulation and monitoring
• IMF: Pledge to increase funding for the IMF and MDBs by $ 1.1 trillion, including a tripling of 
the IMF’s lending capacity by restocking the IMF with $500 billion and creating $250 billion of 
new Special Drawing Rights.
• World Bank: support for increase in lending of at least $100 billion and implementation of 
2008 reforms
• Commitment to conclude an “ambitious” Doha Round and to avoid protectionist measures 
Pittsburgh,  
September 2009
• Agreed on a “Framework for Strong, Sustainable and Balanced Growth” to coordinate 
and monitor national economic policies to correct the current global imbalances and 
prevent future such imbalances, with some peer review and some IMF oversight of this 
macroeconomic policy coordination
• Specific plans to increase the representation of emerging-market countries at the IMF by 
increasing their quota by five percentage points to 43% of the total and similar initiatives at 
the World Bank
• Commitment to crack down on financial institution excesses, including raising capital 
standards, implementing international compensation standards and adopting frameworks for 
cross-border resolutions of failed institutions
• Commitment to conclude the Doha Round by the end of 2010
Participants Washington: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France1, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, 
Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands2, Rep. of Korea, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Spain2, 
Turkey, United Kingdom, United States 
Ex-officio participants: European Commission (President), World Bank (President), Secretary 
General of the UN, IMF (Managing Director), Financial Stability Forum (Chairman)
London: All Washington participants plus Czech Republic3 and ex-officio participants: Chair of 
New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), Chair of Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN), WTO (Director-General) 
Pittsburgh: All participants from London with Sweden3 representing the EU Council rather than 
the Czech Republic
1 Representing EU Council and themselves
2 Permitted extraordinary presence
3 Representing the EU Council 
Source: G20 website, www.g20.org
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With each successive wave of economic crisis to 
hit the world—from the Asian meltdowns in 1997 
to Russia’s ruble crisis in 1998 to the collapse of 
Argentina in 1999 and 2000—there has been a 
subsequent torrent of hand-wringing, post-mortem 
analysis, and calls for reforms to the architecture 
of global economic governance in order to speed 
recovery and prevent such crises from reoccurring  
Equally compelling has been a wave of tragedies—
from the tsunami in the Indian Ocean to Hurricane 
Katrina in 2005 to the enduring poverty throughout 
much of Africa—that have tested the world’s 
ability to respond, accompanied by calls for a 
better approach to development contained in 
many a bestselling book or prominent commission 
report  On the trade front, the WTO took center 
stage not long after its creation, when protestors 
outnumbered delegates at its Ministerial meeting 
in Seattle in 1999, setting a precedent for civil 
disturbances at meetings of the WTO, IMF, and 
World Bank ever since  Overall, the clamoring 
for reform reached a crescendo with the Great 
Recession of 2008-2009, which has prompted a 
number of pledges from political leaders to learn 
from the mistakes of the past and to reform the 
global economic architecture to meet the challenges 
of the 21st century 
The various calls for reform have pin-pointed 
problems of relevance, effectiveness, and legitimacy  
Waning relevance in the case of the IMF has been 
detected as a result of the ascendance of private 
capital markets; at the World Bank, as a result 
of the rise of China and other new economic 
powers engaging in infrastructure development; 
and at the WTO as a result of the proliferation of 
regional trade agreements  Waning effectiveness at 
the IMF is a claim directed at the Fund’s inability 
to tackle global imbalances and its “mission 
creep” into bailouts; at the World Bank it has been 
identified in relation to the inability substantially 
to improve poverty rates, particularly in Africa, or 
adequately address environmental, human rights 
or corruption concerns, along with a perceived 
“mission creep;” and at the WTO it has arisen from 
the inability to conclude the Doha Round despite 
the nine years that have lapsed since talks began 
in November 2001  Finally, waning legitimacy has 
been diagnosed at both the IMF and the World 
Bank as a result of the lack of voting power or 
quota levels held by emerging and developing 
countries and the perception that the institutions 
are controlled by a handful of wealthy countries 
that impose conditionality on others but not 
themselves; at the WTO, it arises from a perceived 
lack of transparency in its operations combined 
with concerns that the consensus-only decision 
making process may be getting in way of reaching 
conclusions, and from a longstanding failure to 
ensure that the benefits of free trade are more 
evenly distributed 9
9 Much work on reform proposals had been done well before 
the G20 Summits  See, for example, World Trade Organization 
(2004), The Future of the WTO: Addressing Institutional 
Challenges in the New Millennium: Report of the Consultation 
Board to the Director-General Supachia Pantichpakdi 
(the”Sutherland Report”); and the report of the IMF’s 
Independent Evaluation Office, Governance of the IMF: An 
Evaluation, 2008  In addition to the work of such commissions, 
there have been countless books and articles written, many of 
which are noted in the bibliography at the end of this article  Key 
among them would be Losing the Global Development War, John 
W  Heard, 2008; Reforming the IMF for the 21st Century, Edwin 
M  Truman, 2006; Redesigning the World Trade Organization 
for the 21st Century, Debra P  Steger (2010); Studies of IMF 
Governance, Ruben Lamdany and Leonardo Diaz Martinez 
(2009); The IMF and its Critics, (2004) and The World Bank: 
Structure and Policies (2000) David Vines and Christopher 
Gilbert; “Reforming the World Bank,” Jessica Einhorn, 
Foreign Affairs, Jan /Feb  2006, Vol  85, Issue 1, and The IMF, 
World Bank and Policy Reform, Alberto Paloni and Maurizio 
Zanardi, Routledge Studies in Development Economics, 2006  
In addition, a number of groups have been formed devoted 
to reform of these institutions, including The Bretton Woods 
Project (www brettonwoodsproject org), New Rules for Global 
Finance Coalition (www new-rules org) and The Fourth Pillar 
(www fourthpillar org) 
The IMF, World Bank, and WTO:  
From Crisis to Reform4
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IMF, the World 
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It is in the face of these challenges that G20 
leaders have called for reforms to the international 
financial institutions  These reforms will primarily 
focus on changes to their mandates, scope, and 
governance to reflect the increasing complexity in 
the world and changes in the economic weight of 
the various players  In addition, the reforms will 
also involve greater coordination and coherence 
among the three economic institutions, along with 
the newly created Financial Stability Board 
Implicit in various calls for reform is a 
reaffirmation of support by the G20 leaders for 
a multilateral approach to economic problems 
and for increased reliance on the multilateral 
economic institutions to help solve them  Such 
increases will necessarily also involve finding a way 
to “multilateralize” many of the existing regional 
agreements that cut into the scope of the work 
of these institutions  Equally implicit in the G20 
leaders’ statements is support for the ongoing work 
of these existing institutions of global economic 
governance  
In the wake of the Second World War, it was America that largely built a system of 
international institutions that carried us through the Cold War. Leaders like Harry 
Truman and George Marshall knew that instead of constraining our power, these 
institutions magnified it.
Today it’s become fashionable to disparage the United Nations, the World Bank, and 
other international organizations. In fact, reform of these bodies is urgently needed 
if they are to keep pace with the fast-moving threats we face. Such real reform will 
not come, however, by dismissing the value of these institutions, or by bullying other 
countries to ratify changes we have drafted in isolation. Real reform will come because 
we convince others that they too have a stake in change—that such reforms will make 
their world, and not just ours, more secure. 
  Then-presidential candidate Barack Obama 
  The Chicago Council on Global Affairs 
  April 23, 2007
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Mission
The principal international institution involved 
in financial stability and finance matters is the 
International Monetary Fund  The Fund has 
evolved considerably from its original role, which 
focused on management of the par value system 
of fixed exchange rates  When the United States 
eliminated adherence to the gold standard and 
the system of pegged exchange rates in 1971, 
countries were left free to choose their exchange 
rate regimes and the IMF’s charter was radically 
amended, pushing it to focus heavily on member 
countries with persistent balance-of-payment 
problems and on responding to crises that threaten 
the international monetary system as a whole  The 
Fund’s scope was also fundamentally altered by 
the emergence of newly independent nations in 
Africa and elsewhere beginning in the late 1950s, 
followed by another wave of new entrants after 
the end of the Cold War, both of which required a 
change in financing and policy advice to support 
growth-oriented structural reforms and transitions 
from centrally-planned to market economies  
The IMF currently carries out its mission 
through a combination of financing (typically 
done through stand-by arrangements or special 
loans), surveillance of countries’ economic and 
financial policies, technical assistance, and policy 
endorsements 
Governance
Both the IMF and the World Bank have a Board 
of Governors made up of a representative of 
all 186 countries which meets twice a year  
The IMF’s Board of Governors is advised by 
two ministerial committees, the International 
Monetary and Financial Committee (IMFC), 
and the Development Committee  While some 
specific powers reside with the Board, the real 
management of the IMF is done by its Executive 
Board of 24 members, five of whom are appointed 
(the United States, Japan, Germany, France, and 
the United Kingdom), three of whom are elected 
by a single country (China, Russia, and Saudi 
Arabia), and 16 of whom are elected to represent 
a group of countries, along with the managing 
director of the IMF, who serves as the chairman 
of the Executive Board 10 Over and above the 
appointees of Germany, France, and the United 
Kingdom, the remaining members of the European 
Union are all represented on the Executive Board 
in one of seven different country groupings  Each 
member of the Executive Board controls a share 
of the total vote at the IMF, depending on the size 
and level of participation of those countries in his 
or her group  The United States has the largest 
single voting share with 16 77 percent, followed 
by Japan (6 02 percent), Germany (5 88 percent), 
France (4 85 percent), and the United Kingdom 
(4 85 percent)  While many decisions at the 
Executive Board are made on the basis of majority 
rule, some key decisions require a super-majority 
vote of 85 percent, which gives the United States, 
with its 16 77 percent share, the ability to block 
such decisions  If the three appointed European 
representatives voted together, they too would 
have more than 15 percent of the vote and would 
have, like the United States, enough power to 
“veto” any action that required a supermajority 
vote of 85 percent  While the IMF’s quota shares 
are automatically updated, these updates have 
not resulted in a substantial shift in power away 
from overrepresented Europe to underrepresented 
emerging market economies 
With respect to recent governance reform efforts at 
the Fund, Managing Director Dominique Strauss-
Kahn created a “four pillar” approach to reform, 
calling for a report from the IMF’s Independent 
Evaluation Office, from an internal Working Group 
10 Including the managing director, there are currently 10 
Europeans (40 percent of the total) serving on the IMF’s 
Executive Board 
Guardian of Global Finance:  
The International Monetary Fund 5
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on IMF Corporate Governance, from civil society 
organizations, and lastly from the Committee on 
IMF Governance Reform headed by South African 
Finance Minister Trevor Manuel  As the Fund’s 
internal report noted, “dissatisfaction with Fund 
governance well pre-dates the crisis,” reflecting a 
sense of waning relevance (given ascendant private 
capital markets), effectiveness (demonstrated by the 
Fund’s inability to tackle global imbalances), and 
legitimacy (with institutional structures described 
as “outmoded and feudalistic”) 11
In attempting to address at least the concerns about 
relevance and legitimacy, the Manuel Committee 
was established in September 2008 and issued its 
report on March 25, 2009, in advance of the spring 
meeting of the IMF  The Committee’s report called 
for:
• The creation of a high-level ministerial council 
(IMF Council) to foster political engagement 
in strategic and critical decisions; 
• An acceleration of the quota and voice reform 
begun in 2009 by shifting to a 70 to 75 percent 
majority for decisions, which would have the 
effect of removing the U S  veto power while 
giving low income countries the ability to band 
together to veto activities they do not like;
• A broader mandate for surveillance to include 
macroeconomic policies, prudential issues, and 
financial spillovers; 
• Clearer lines of responsibility and 
accountability among various decision-making 
entities in the Fund with more authority 
for member-specific surveillance given 
to management and greater strategic and 
supervisory roles for the Executive Board; and
11 International Monetary Fund, “IMF Governance—Summary 
of Issues and Reform Options”, Strategy Policy, and Review 
Department and the Legal Department, Jul  1, 2009 
• The introduction of an open, transparent, and 
independent-of-nationality selection process 
for the Managing Director, thereby eliminating 
the unwritten rule that the Managing Director 
must be a European  
For its part, the Independent Evaluation Office 
report, Governance of the IMF, recommended:
• Clarification and alteration of the roles and 
responsibilities within the IMF governance 
structure to minimize overlaps and close gaps;
• Active and systematic ministerial-level 
involvement in setting strategic goals and 
overseeing performance;
• Reorientation of the Board away from 
executive functions to a supervisory role 
focused on formulating strategy, monitoring 
policy implementation, and exercising 
executive oversight; and
• Establishment of a framework to hold 
management accountable for its performance 
Civil society organizations, for their part, 
emphasized through their “fourth pillar” process a 
greater need for transparency and communication, 
particularly with the executive directors, along with 
strong calls for changes to the distribution of voting 
power and quotas and increased accountability 
for the executive board  They also insisted that 
the selection of the managing director and the 
deputies should be conducted via a merit-based, 
transparent process without any restrictions as to 
the nationality of the candidates 
Mandate
With respect to the mandate of the IMF, the 
current economic crisis has pointed to the need for 
a number of substantial changes to the mandate 
of the IMF  These include the establishment of a 
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sound early warning system for macroeconomic 
and financial risks, broader surveillance of all 
members’ macroeconomic policies (including the 
United States and European Union member states), 
tougher oversight of exchange rate imbalances, 
and broad-based support for growth in developing 
countries by helping finance counter-cyclical 
spending, bank recapitalization, infrastructure, 
trade finance, balance of payments support, debt 
rollover, and social support  
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Mission
Among the multilateral institutions, the task 
of promoting global development and poverty 
alleviation primarily falls to the World Bank  The 
World Bank has evolved from its inception as 
an institution with 44 member countries and a 
focus on postwar reconstruction to a development 
services organization with more than 10,000 
employees and an administrative budget of $1 6 
billion  Last year, its loan commitments totaled 
$46 9 billion  Over the years, its core focus has 
shifted from growth through trade and investment 
in partnership with middle-income countries to 
an organization set on alleviating poverty and 
promoting development in poor countries 
In the main, the United States and Europe have 
had shared goals for and commitment to the work 
of the World Bank Group  However, historically 
there have been some differences in approach  At 
its inception, the United States saw the Bank as 
responsible for building a strong middle-class and 
overall economic prosperity in middle-income 
countries, in part to provide markets for U S  
exports  As the Bank moved from reconstruction 
to a focus on development, the United States 
has typically favored a mission that continues to 
place strong emphasis on the pursuit of economic 
growth and productive investment that leans 
heavily on the private sector  Europe was initially 
on the receiving end of the Bank’s reconstruction 
efforts, until much of that work was taken over 
by the Marshall Plan  Once fully recovered, 
Europe began to push for the Bank to work almost 
exclusively with the poorest countries and the 
poorest pockets of the middle-income countries, 
and the Europeans remain strong proponents 
of this primary focus on poverty alleviation  
Governance
The governance structure of the World Bank largely 
mirrors the structure of the IMF, with a Board of 
Governors that meets twice a year and the real 
management of the Bank done by its Executive 
Boards, which are also composed of 24 directors 
who are appointed or elected by the same member 
countries or groups of countries as the IMF along 
with the president of the Bank, who serves as its 
chairman 12 The voting weight of each country 
is made up of both basic votes (whose value has 
eroded over time) and votes that are dependent on 
a country’s shareholding in the Bank  Unlike at the 
IMF, which has automatic quota reviews every five 
years, shareholding adjustments are made through 
periodic—and generally very political—processes  
With 16 4 percent, the United States has by far 
the largest voting weight at the Executive Board 
of the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, followed by Japan (7 87 percent), 
Germany (4 49 percent), France (4 31 percent), 
and the United Kingdom (4 31 percent)  These 
five countries have the right to appoint their own 
representatives to all four Executive Boards  Three 
other countries elect a single representative to 
each of the Executive Boards (China, Russia and 
Saudi Arabia), while the remaining 16 directors 
are elected to represent a group of countries  As 
with the IMF, all of the other members of the 
European Union participate as part of a group of 
countries represented by one of seven other elected 
representatives on the Executive Board 
Decisions at the Bank are made by simple majority 
vote for ordinary decisions and by supermajority 
(85 percent) for one type of decision—amendments 
to the Article of Agreement  As at the IMF, because 
12 Technically the World Bank Group has four boards (IBRD, 
IDA, IFC, and MIGA) of executive directors with slightly 
different voting percentages for each, but as a practical matter, 
the same individual typically serves as the executive director on 
all four 
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Table 4. The World Bank Group today
World Bank Group Est. Areas of specialization Cumulative Lending/
commitments 
(billions)
Fiscal 2009 Lending/ 
commitments 
(billions)
International Bank 
for Reconstruction 
and Development
1944 Focuses on lending to public 
sector entities in poor to 
middle income countries.
$479  
(effective FY 2005, 
includes guarantees)
$32.9 for 126 new 
operations in 42 
countries
International 
Development 
Association
1960 IDA lends to world’s poorest 
countries. Provides interest-
free loans and grants to 
public sector to boost growth 
and reduce inequality. Major 
source of financing for 
infrastructure.
$207 
(effective FY 2005, 
includes guarantees)
$14 for 176 new 
operations in 63 
countries
International 
Finance 
Corporation
1956 Finances private sector 
investment, mobilizing capital 
in financial markets, and 
providing advisory services 
to businesses. IFC invests in 
enterprises majority-owned 
by the private sector. Aims 
to address constraints to 
private sector investment in 
infrastructure, health, and 
education.
$34.4 (plus $8 in 
syndicated loans)
$10.5 committed 
and $4 mobilized for 
447 projects in 103 
countries
Multilateral 
Investment 
Guarantee  
Agency
1988 Promotes FDI into developing 
countries by providing political 
risk insurance (guarantees) 
to the private sector. Insures 
investment against losses 
related to expropriation, 
currency transfer restrictions, 
civil disturbance/war, breach 
of contract, non-honoring 
of sovereign financial 
obligations.
$20.9 
(includes amounts 
leveraged through 
the Cooperative 
Underwriting Program)
$1.4 in guarantees 
issued for 26 projects
International 
Centre for 
Settlement of 
Investment 
Disputes
1966 Autonomous international 
institution aims to provide 
facilities for conciliation and 
arbitration of international 
investment disputes.
292 cases registered 24 cases registered 
in 2009
The term “World Bank” typically refers only to the IBRD and IDA. The World Bank Group also encompasses the IFC, MIGA, and ICSID. 
Source: World Bank Annual Report 2009.
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the United States controls more than 15 percent 
of the vote, it alone has an effective “veto” power 
to block any such changes to the Article, and a 
mythology has ballooned around the perceived 
reach of this veto power  
Many proposals for governance reform at the World 
Bank have been made over the years, primarily 
aimed at addressing the various imbalances that 
result from the appointed seats held by the “big 
three” European countries, or from the U S  “veto” 
power  Most recently, in October 2008, World Bank 
President Robert Zoellick established a high-level 
commission, headed by former Mexican President 
Ernesto Zedillo, to “focus on the modernization of 
World Bank Group governance so the World Bank 
Group can operate more dynamically, effectively, 
efficiently, and legitimately in a transformed global 
political economy ” 
At the outset, the Commission on Modernization 
of World Bank Group Governance noted 
significant weaknesses in three key areas of the 
Bank’s decision making and governance processes: 
strategy formulation, voice and participation, and 
accountability 
On strategy formulation, the Commission found 
that the Bank lacks an effective means to formulate 
a clear strategy that can be used to set priorities, 
balance tradeoffs, and align operations and 
resources with strategic goals  In part, this is due to 
the advisory nature of the Development Committee 
and the insufficient time available to—and seniority 
among—the members of the Bank’s current 
Executive Board  
On voice and participation, the Commission noted 
that the decision-making process is widely seen 
as too exclusive and that a number of conventions 
and practices create the perception that the Bank 
is accountable and responsive to at best only a 
handful of shareholders  Contributing to this 
perception is the significant gap between the voting 
shares of developing versus developed countries, 
an allocation of voting power and special majority 
rules that gives rise to the “U S  veto” and the 
considerable overrepresentation of European 
countries on the Bank’s Executive Boards 
On accountability, the Commission cited in 
particular the ambiguous relationship between the 
Board and management, the conflict of interest 
from the president of the Bank also serving 
as the chairman of the Executive Boards, the 
difficulty in holding the president accountable 
for performance, and the non-transparent 
process for the selection of the president, with its 
unwritten convention that the president of the 
Bank must be a U S  citizen (just as the managing 
director of the IMF must be a European) 
The Zedillo Commission issued its report 
in October 2009, which included five 
recommendations that the Commission noted need 
to be adopted and implemented as a single package:
• Enhancing voice and participation by 
consolidating the board to 20 chairs from the 
current 24, composing the board entirely of 
elected chairs that represent multi-country 
constituencies, and eliminating the link 
between the IMF quotas and the World Bank 
voting powers;
• Restructuring the World Bank’s governing bodies 
by elevating the Board to ministerial level with 
responsibility for overall strategy and direction, 
major policy decisions, oversight and selection 
of the President, delegating to management the 
approval of financing operations and creating 
an advisory council of representatives;
• Reforming the leadership selection process by 
creating a rules-based, inclusive, competitive 
process for selecting the President that does 
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away with the current un-written rule that 
reserves the Bank presidency to a U S  citizen;
• Strengthening management accountability by 
creating a performance review process for 
the Bank president, increasing use of external 
evaluations and increasing reviews of those 
providing safety nets for the poorest; and
• Strengthen the Bank’s resource base through 
increases to its capital base 
Mandate
With respect to the mandate of the World Bank, 
significant change has already occurred  However, 
as the many calls for reform indicate, much remains 
to be done  With four branches in addition to the 
original International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development and the establishment of regional 
development banks, the World Bank has moved far 
beyond its initial role of lending to public-sector 
entities for reconstruction  Much of the World 
Bank’s current support is provided through equity 
investments, financial services, and political risk 
insurance, in addition to traditional lending and 
project financing  
In today’s world, it is clear that more needs to 
be done to broaden and deepen the role of the 
Bank, particularly in its relationships with non-
state actors, be they private business, NGOs, or 
bilateral aid donors, as central components of its 
development strategy and to ensure that it is not 
trying to be all things to all people  Global leaders 
and scholars alike have noted that the path to 
economic recovery is one that will be primarily 
paved by the private sector, be it small and large 
businesses, entrepreneurs, microfinance lending 
groups, or risk-takers and financiers from around 
the world  
Private sector growth has been the engine that 
allowed hundreds of millions of people to lift 
themselves out of poverty in China and India in 
recent decades  From Dambisa Moyo’s notion, 
in Dead Aid, that development assistance to 
governments is “easy money” that furthers poor 
governance and adds to the poverty of Africa rather 
than helping it, to R  Glenn Hubbard and William 
Duggan’s call, in The Aid Trap, for a new Marshall 
Plan of lending directly to private enterprises in 
the world’s poorest nations, to the inclusion of a 
global partnership for development with the private 
sector as part of the Millennium Development 
Goals, there are growing calls for more resources 
to be directly granted to private and local business 
in order to both cultivate a middle class and to 
place market incentives and disciplines on more 
economic activity  In addition, the Bank needs to 
adjust its approach to address the considerable 
competition it now faces in the development 
of infrastructure from countries, particularly 
China, who are willing to invest directly in large-
scale projects without many of the policy strings 
(“conditionality”) normally attached by the Bank 
to those activities  It also needs to ensure that 
the Bank is playing as big a role as possible in the 
effort to ensure that development and sustainable 
economic activity go hand in hand  Moreover, 
the G20 has conferred on the Bank a leading role 
in responding to problems requiring “globally 
coordinated action, such as climate change and 
food security ”13
13 Pittsburgh Summit, Leaders’ Statement, September 24-25, 
2009, paragraph 21 
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Mission
As with the IMF and the World Bank, the principal 
governing institution of the global trading 
system—first the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade, then its successor, the World Trade 
Organization—has undergone major changes since 
it was first conceived in the 1940s  Following the 
failure of the United States to ratify the Havana 
Charter that would have created the International 
Trade Organization, a smaller group of 23 countries 
joined together in a looser arrangement to provide 
reciprocal tariff reductions and to agree to certain 
codes governing their trading relationships  The 
GATT provided the forum in which eight rounds 
of multilateral trade negotiations were completed, 
substantially lowering tariffs on industrial goods 
among industrial countries (although not yet 
in agricultural products or the labor-intensive 
manufactured goods of export interest to many 
developing countries)  Through its system of tariff 
bindings, transparency, and adherence to rules—
especially the principle of nondiscrimination 
expressed in the most favored nation (MFN) and 
national treatment provisions—the GATT also 
provided an underpinning of institutional stability 
and predictability in international trade that served 
as a guarantor against the threat of 1930s-style 
protectionism throughout the second half of the 
20th century 
With the increasing complexity of global commerce 
came the recognition among GATT members of the 
need for an organization that could provide more 
comprehensive regulation of international trade  
The ITO as it was originally envisioned would have 
held a wide remit beyond trade in goods, with the 
ability to negotiate rules governing labor standards, 
commodity agreements, restrictive business 
practices, international investment, and trade 
in services  With the conclusion of the Uruguay 
Round negotiations, the GATT membership 
agreed to the launch, in 1995, of a full-fledged 
Negotiating the Rules: The World Trade 
Organization7
international organization, the World Trade 
Organization, which now has a membership of 153 
countries  As with the original ITO, the WTO is 
concerned with disciplines on trade beyond just 
goods, and covers trade in agriculture and services 
as well as rules on intellectual property, subsidies, 
investment, and trade facilitation  The WTO also 
boasts a binding dispute settlement mechanism 
Governance
Unlike the Bank and the Fund, the WTO does 
not have a formal governance structure with a 
governing or executive board  Instead, the WTO is 
a member-driven institution, run by its members 
with a relatively small secretariat that has very 
limited power to propose, much less to impose, 
solutions to problems  It is organized through a 
series of councils—primarily the General Council, 
the Dispute Settlement Body, and the Trade Policy 
Review Body, along with the Council for Trade in 
Goods, the Council for Trade in Services, and the 
Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights—which are chaired by a Geneva 
representative of a WTO member country with 
an annual rotation of the chairs  In addition, there 
are numerous committees and working parties 
on particular issues that are open to all members  
While the agreement establishing the WTO set 
forth a number of procedures by which votes could 
be taken on certain issues, in practice the WTO has 
continued to operate on a consensus basis  
Cries for reform of the WTO began in earnest 
following the huge protests and failure to 
reach agreement at the WTO’s infamous 1999 
Ministerial Conference in Seattle, Washington  
Four years later, shortly before another less-than-
successful Ministerial Conference in Cancún, 
the then-Director General of the WTO, Supachai 
Panitchpakdi, established a consultative board to 
address the future of the WTO and the institutional 
challenges it faced  That group, led by former WTO 
Saving Multilateralism 
Renovating the house of global economic governance for the 21st century
25
Director General Peter Sutherland, issued its report 
in December 2005, on the tenth anniversary of the 
creation of WTO  
Among other things, the Sutherland Report 
focused on the consensus-based decision-making 
process  It recommended that more onus be placed 
on any member blocking a measure that otherwise 
enjoys strong consensus, and that the WTO re-
examine the principle of plurilateral approaches 
to negotiations and the possibility of approving 
decisions by a critical mass of members  Also 
recommended were regular annual ministerial 
meetings, a WTO Summit of world leaders every 
five years, and the establishment of a consultative 
body for senior officials that would meet on a 
quarterly basis  It urged the development of a set of 
objectives for the WTO’s relations with civil society 
and the public at large  The report also expressed 
deep concerns about the spread of regional 
preferential trade agreements and called for such 
agreements to be subject to meaningful review and 
effective disciplines at the WTO  
Two years later, Warwick University in the United 
Kingdom established its first Warwick Commission 
with a broad mandate to examine the governance 
of the multilateral trading system in light of 
growing challenges  The Commission looked at 
ways to counter growing opposition to further 
trade liberalization in industrialized countries and 
to ensure that the end of the dual domination of 
the trade regime by the United States and Europe 
does not give way to long-term stalemate or 
disengagement  It sought ways to forge a broad-
based agreement about the WTO’s objectives and 
functions and to ensure that the WTO’s many 
agreements result in benefits for its weakest 
members  Finally, as with the Sutherland Report, 
it looked at ways to ensure that the proliferation 
of regional preferential trade agreements 
does not undermine the WTO principles 
of nondiscrimination and transparency in 
international commerce  Among other things, the 
Warwick Commission recommended a critical mass 
approach to decision-making and urged that the 
industrialized countries refrain from negotiating 
preferential agreements with each other as well as 
the development of WTO disciplines and review 
mechanisms for such agreements  At its most recent 
Ministerial Conference in December 2009, in the 
face of the continued inability to conclude the Doha 
Development Round of trade talks, more than 20 
countries endorsed a proposal to establish a process 
to review the WTO’s “functioning, efficiency, and 
transparency, and consider possible improvements” 
in light of the “rapid change in the global economic 
environment” and the need for the WTO to be 
“agile and responsive ” To date, none of these calls 
for reform have resulted in any changes in the 
WTO’s governance structure 
Mandate
The WTO is still wrestling with the new mandate 
it was given in the transition from the GATT 
to an institution with a scope that was closer 
to that of the original ITO  Already a chorus of 
voices—including that of the European Union—is 
calling for a still-further broadening of the WTO’s 
mandate, with some attributing the failure to 
conclude the Doha Round in part on its narrow 
agenda of “yesterday’s issues”—namely, market 
access in agriculture, in goods, and in services 14 
Other WTO members like Brazil and South Africa 
are more resistant, refusing to move on to new 
issues until developed country members make 
good on a promise that was made at the end of 
14 See for example, Aaditya Mattoo and Arvind Subramanian, 
“From Doha to the Next Bretton Woods, A New Multilateral 
Trade Agenda,” Foreign Affairs, Jan /Feb  2009, contending that 
a new round of talks is needed to develop a more ambitious 
agenda than Doha, involving a broader set of institutions than 
just the WTO and focusing on a wider array of issues, including 
food security (export bans on agriculture, biofuels policies, etc), 
cartels, energy trade, exchange rates, regulation of sovereign 
wealth funds, and climate change 
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the Uruguay Round—that, after a half-century 
of resistance, liberalization would be extended to 
trade in farm products and in light manufactures 
of export interest to developing countries  This 
long-running standoff is at the heart of the present 
deadlock in the Doha Round  
However these issues find resolution, it is clear that 
if the WTO is to remain relevant it will need to be 
engaged in the trade issues, broadly defined, of the 
twenty-first century  These include competition 
policy, investment policy, energy policy, food 
security, global health services, technology, 
environmental goods and services, and a host 
of additional issues that are both contentious 
and at the core of business concerns—including 
corruption, corporate social responsibility, 
exchange rates, immigration, and cyber security  
Saving Multilateralism 
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A number of obvious commonalities and themes 
stand out from these various calls for reform of the 
Bretton Woods architecture:
• All recognize that the institutions of global 
economic governance were created at a 
very different time and under very different 
circumstances but have failed to change, 
particularly with respect to the changing 
distribution of economic weight and power 
among nations;
• All recognize that the imperative for change 
must come from political leaders who are 
above any particular institution in recognition 
of the fact that it is virtually impossible to 
change governance structures from within, 
particularly when such changes involve shifting 
power away from some to others;
• All call for increased and active involvement 
at higher political levels in the governance of 
the institutions, particularly in setting strategic 
direction; and
• All support a broadening or deepening of the 
range of activities and mandates of the existing 
institutions  
It remains to be seen whether the sheer imperative 
for a coordinated global response to the financial 
crisis and the emergence of a broader and stronger 
consensus among the G20 leaders will provide 
the needed catalyst for change, or whether these 
blueprints for reform will join a long line of well-
thought-out proposals issued with varying degrees 
of fanfare only to sink without trace in the ocean of 
well-meaning but failed ideas, swept away by many 
of the same forces that make it harder to reach 
international consensus on anything  However this 
may be, in the meantime it is a source of hope that 
the change that is most needed is not impossible to 
achieve  For the multilateral economic institutions 
do not need to be completely reconstructed 
from the ground up  That would be unrealistic  
The current crisis is unlikely to be either deep 
enough or of sufficient duration to create a “1944 
moment”—a constitution-making moment 
when major new institutions and institutional 
relationships can be built anew or created out of 
whole cloth  Instead, what is most needed is more 
akin to a renovation and not a rebuilding  
This renovation of the house of global economic 
governance would involve a rebalancing of power 
within the existing institutions away from Europe 
and the United States and toward the rest of 
the world  It would involve a broadening of the 
mandates of these institutions to enable them 
to address the new issues of the day  It would 
mean a deepening of the coordination among the 
institutions, including the WTO, to ensure that 
pressing issues do not fall between the cracks  
Finally, it would mean a new commitment on 
the part of the major players to work to bring 
the proliferation of regional agreements on the 
sidelines into their folds 
How can this be done?
Renovating the House of Global 
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The simplest way to achieve these goals is to 
transform the G20 into a “Council of Governors” 
for the three established international economic 
institutions plus the new Financial Stability Board  
While the G20 may not be perfect—and debate 
will doubtless continue as to whether the current 
configuration is the optimal one—the fact is that 
it has defied its doubters in reaching consensus 
on specific approaches to a number of critical and 
controversial issues  Both the United States and 
Europe emerged from the three summits with a 
good deal of confidence in the grouping  “When 
we are talking about reform of the international 
system…the G20 was seen as the right body for 
these decisions to be made at,” noted British Prime 
Minister Gordon Brown  U S  President Barack 
Obama noted that “the G20 will take the lead in 
building a new approach to cooperation ” This 
augurs well for the G20 becoming—as Nicolas 
Sarkozy stated at the World Economic Forum this 
January, “the harbinger of global governance in the 
21st century ” The G20 Council of Governors would 
establish strategic goals and then give the various 
institutions the job of carrying them out  
This G20 “Council of Governors” would focus on 
three main tasks: 
• Setting the strategic direction of the 
international institutions (IMF, World Bank, 
WTO, and FSB) to ensure their mandates are 
broad enough to cover the many issues that 
are now falling between the cracks yet tailored 
enough to ensure that inefficient overlaps or 
mission creep are avoided; 
• Pushing through the necessary changes 
in the voting and power structures at 
the IMF and World Bank to ensure that 
those institutions’ governance structures 
reflect changes in economic weight, while 
The Harbinger of Global Governance: 
Political Leadership and the G209
at the same time infusing the WTO with 
direction and support from a smaller 
group of higher level officials; and
• Holding the international institutions 
accountable for implementing the directives 
that come from the G20 summits and giving 
the international institutions a forum to 
hold the G20 leaders accountable for their 
commitments to the institutions  
Providing the G20 with such a role would allow the 
group to set strategic direction and then use the 
considerable expertise and qualified personnel at 
each of the institutions to carry out its instructions  
By giving the G20 the continuing role of coming 
together at least once or twice a year to perform the 
fiduciary duty of direction-setting and oversight 
for these institutions, the G20 would be assured of 
a consistent and on-going role in setting the course 
of global economic activity  Use of the G20 for this 
role would also give the emerging market countries 
a permanent and significant voice in global 
economic governance, getting them more engaged 
in addressing problems at the multilateral level and 
allowing them to play an important brokering role 
when differences between the United States and 
Europe threaten to cause global gridlock  
A G20 Council of Governors could also ensure 
that any country putting up roadblocks to the 
implementation of agreed-upon changes can 
be singled out and pressured in the “court of 
international opinion” to permit necessary changes 
to move ahead  This increased accountability would 
move in both directions, with the institutions 
themselves having access to a high-level political 
body to which to take concerns about failures to 
follow through with prior commitments  Playing 
this strategic leadership role would also allow the 
G20 to fill an oft-cited need for high-level political 
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engagement in the international institutions, albeit 
at an even higher level than initially envisaged by 
the reformers  Finally, inclusion of the World Trade 
Organization within the ambit of responsibility 
of this “Council of Governors” would ensure 
that the WTO takes its rightful place among the 
international institutions, in recognition of the 
critical link between finance, development, and 
trade, and the imperative of using the expertise and 
rules of the WTO to ensure that private enterprise 
can be fully engaged in worldwide economic 
recovery and future prosperity  In addition to this 
new role for the G20, it will also be necessary to 
reaffirm support for the multilateral institutions 
at the highest political levels, and to address the 
explosion of regional agreements 
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On the one hand, the international organizations 
have been taken somewhat for granted as a 
widely-accepted commonplace on the global 
scene  On the other hand, they have become the 
source of virulent protests and stinging political 
rebukes from many quarters  Those on the right, 
particularly in the United States, deeply resent the 
United Nations and see it as a sinister instrument 
of foreign domination  On the other side of the 
ideological spectrum, those on the left frequently 
get out the placards and line the protest routes for 
most meetings of the WTO or IMF and World 
Bank, objecting to what they see as the role of 
these institutions in exacerbating the worst of 
globalization—growing inequality that funnels 
wealth to the multinational corporations while 
leaving the poorest countries ever farther behind 
Particularly at this time of crisis, it is essential that 
those who understand and appreciate the critical 
work of these institutions stand up for them and 
for the broad multilateralism that they represent  
Failure to do so will only undermine trust in the 
institutions and in the belief that global economic 
problems can and should be addressed globally  If 
nothing else, the international institutions bring 
both economies of scale and deep expertise that 
cannot be readily replaced  As the world and its 
problems grow more complex, this knowledge—
accumulated in many countries and over a long 
period of time—can only be put to good use if the 
institutions themselves are properly maintained  
The institutions also have greater staying power and 
a longer-term, broader-based approach to resolving 
global economic problems than any bilateral 
or regional arrangement does  They have been 
bringing together people and ideas from around the 
world for more than 60 years in countless forums, 
meetings, project planning sessions, and more 
Away from all the teargas and the ideological 
smokescreens, it is in the mundane day-to-day 
meetings, reports, and projects being conducted 
Reaffirming Multilateralism in a 
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within these institutions that multilateralism is 
most often advanced  Countries get in the habit 
of working together and come to important 
understandings about both the substance and the 
procedures for their collective action  A steady 
stream of information is exchanged, understandings 
reached, and norms established through these 
institutional gatherings  For example, despite 
the inability of the WTO to reach consensus on 
completion of the Doha Round, much agreement 
and common understanding has been achieved 
through the ongoing work of the various WTO 
committees, particularly the Council for Trade 
in Services and the Committee on Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures 15 While these practices 
don’t rise to the level of formal rulemaking, they do 
form much of the bread-and-butter of multilateral 
activity that is critical if countries are going to a 
come together in times of crisis 
The statements of G20 leaders and others 
supporting these multilateral institutions and 
their work in particular—and the principles of 
multilateral cooperation in general—are to be 
commended, and will need to be repeated over and 
over as the institutions continue to grapple with the 
often-contentious issues of the 21st century  At the 
same time, a number of threats to multilateralism 
must be acknowledged and addressed  Most 
importantly among these is the rapid growth 
of regionalism and regional alliances and trade 
arrangements  
15 For example, the WTO Committee on Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures has adopted a decision on the 
implementation of Article 4 of the SPS Agreement regarding 
recognition of “equivalence” of different standards, procedures 
to enhance transparency, and guidelines to further the 
implementation of the SPS provisions on regional and pest-free 
areas  See Andrew Lang and Joanne Scott, “The Hidden World 
of WTO Governance,” The European Journal of International 
Law, Vol  20, Issue 3, 2009, pp  575-614, citing WTO Doc S/C/
M18 and WTO Doc S/CSC/M/17 
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The debate over whether regional agreements—
and regional trade agreements in particular—
contribute to or detract from the multilateral 
system has grown in intensity as the number 
of new agreements, most recently in Asia, has 
skyrocketed  Indeed, in the first 45 years of the 
GATT—the period between 1948 and the creation 
of the WTO at the conclusion of the Uruguay 
Round—124 regional trade agreements were 
notified, less than three a year  By contrast, the 
last 15 years saw 333 new notifications of such 
agreements, more than 22 a year  As of October 
15, 2009, 457 regional trade agreements had been 
notified to the WTO, 266 of which are currently 
in force 16 The most recent is the Association of 
South East Asian Nations (ASEAN)-China Free 
Trade Area (ACFTA), launched on January 1, 2010  
This is the largest free-trade area in the world by 
population (1 9 billion), with a combined GDP 
of $6 trillion, making it the third largest (behind 
the European Union and NAFTA) by economic 
value  The ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free 
Trade Agreement (AANZFTA) also went into effect 
on January 1, covering 600 million people and a 
combined GDP of $2 8 trillion 
Nor is trade the only area in which a spaghetti 
bowl of regional alliances are coming into force  
The Chiang Mai Initiative Multilaterization 
(CMIM), a regional financial mechanism in 
Asia, encompassing the ASEANs, Japan, Korea, 
and China, set up a $120 billion facility designed 
to strengthen the region’s capacity to safeguard 
against increased risks and challenges in the 
global economy  The core objectives of this “Asian 
Monetary Fund” are (i) to address balance-of-
payments and short-term liquidity difficulties 
in the region, and (ii) to supplement the existing 
international financial arrangements  As such, it 
represents regional competition to the IMF, albeit 
16 World Trade Organization, “Report of the Committee on 
Regional Trade Agreements”, WT/Reg/20, 16 Oct  2009 
with a low enough total capital base for now that 
the IMF will likely remain the lender of last resort 
even within the CMIM region  
In the development arena, the World Bank has 
seen an explosion in the use of trust funds, which 
are bilateral or regional development funds 
masquerading as multilateral ones  The World 
Bank may administer them, but the funds must 
be spent where and how the often sole donor 
designates  Over a thousand such trust funds 
have been established in recent years  Last year, 
disbursements from such trust funds equaled half 
of the World Bank’s total disbursements  Together 
with bilateral development assistance, such trust 
funds allow donors to impose their own goals 
and strategy, which can bring in bilateral political 
pressures or a short-term or narrow focus that may 
not be in the best interests of a country as a whole  
China, for example, has put billions of dollars into 
infrastructure projects in Africa while contributing 
only $30 million to the International Development 
Association (IDA), the World Bank arm designed 
to help the poorest countries 
All in all, this turn to regional or bilateral 
arrangements in lieu of multilateral ones is 
huge, with approximately 50 percent of all trade 
occurring under such agreements and about 65 
percent of all aid currently coming from trust 
funds, bilateral aid funds, or “vertical” loans or 
grants focused on a particular issue  Why such a 
dramatic shift? Many countries around the world 
have turned away from multilateralism and the 
multilateral institutions for a number of reasons  
First, there are non-institutional alternatives to the 
multilateral system—ranging from a broad array 
of private investment tools that supplant the IMF 
to huge infrastructure projects that are financed 
by foreign governments or other aid funds, often 
undermining the role of the World Bank  Second, 
many developing countries are skeptical about 
institutions set up by the transatlantic powers in 
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which they don’t have a significant voice or any 
great confidence that the institutions will address 
their needs  Third, they have found regional 
agreements easier to reach, either because they 
don’t require solving some of the hardest problems 
on the table in multilateral negotiations—for 
example, agricultural subsidy issues at the WTO—
or simply because reaching an agreement on a 
bilateral or regional basis is easier than trying to 
reach an agreement among the multitude of parties 
to any agreement at the multilateral level 
The downsides of this rush to regionalism are 
many  The time, energy, and resources required 
to negotiate bilateral or regional agreements are 
considerable, and by necessity take away valuable 
time, resources, and political capital available to 
countries to devote to multilateral agreements  At 
the same time, bilateral or regional agreements 
are much more subject to the vagaries of domestic 
politics—indeed, they are often initiated in 
response to particularistic commercial or foreign 
policy pressures  Then, once they are in force, 
most of these agreements have weak or non-
existent dispute settlement mechanisms, making 
commitments under such agreements harder 
to enforce  Bilateral and regional agreements 
often have unique rules and provisions, which 
increases overall transaction costs in the system 
and makes it difficult for developing countries 
to understand what they need to do to comply 
with a wide array of differing sets of rules  On 
the trade side, such agreements often exclude 
particular products or don’t allow for cumulation 
of inputs or resources from countries outside 
of the particular agreement, which can lead to 
inefficiencies and to hub-and-spoke systems of 
trade in which power-based arrangements begin 
to erode the protection of a rules-based non-
discriminatory multilateral trading system 17 
Finally—and most importantly—proliferating 
preferential agreements by their very existence 
send a strong signal of a growing lack of faith in 
multilateral institutions and the multilateral system 
As such, it is imperative that the multilateral 
system work to fix problems that act as a deterrent 
to deeper engagement by developing countries 
while at the same time working to bring the 
various bilateral and regional arrangements within 
their systems  The multilateral institutions need 
to recognize that the regional agreements are 
massive in magnitude and scope and have added 
enormous complexity to the system, but that at 
the same time they are here to stay  Most urgently 
needed from the multilateral institutions are clear 
guidelines for any such agreements to ensure that 
they are stepping stones to multilateralism rather 
than barriers to entry for anyone outside any given 
regional or bilateral arrangement 
17 The potential for regional trade agreements to undermine 
the multilateral system have been widely discussed  See for 
example Jagdish Bhagwati, Termites in the Trading System: How 
Preferential Agreements Undermine Free Trade, Council on 
Foreign Relations (2008) 
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During the critical period of the Bretton Woods 
conference of 1944 and in the months that 
followed, a large part of the world picked itself up 
from the ruins of depression and war and rallied 
around the vision—largely set forth by the United 
States and Great Britain—to create institutions 
and accords that would prevent a repetition of 
the disasters of the 1930s by allowing for global 
economic cooperation and multilateral governance  
Then-U S  President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, 
in his last address to the U S  Congress, declared 
that “the world will either move toward unity and 
widely shared prosperity, or it will move apart,” 
noting that the then-emerging plans for the Bretton 
Woods institutions and the global trading system 
represented the chance “to lay the economic basis 
for the secure and peaceful world we all desire ”
The present global economic crisis has not been of 
the same order of magnitude of the events of the 
1930s  But it does represent another transformative 
moment in world history  In particular, it presents 
the United States and Europe with another 
opportunity to exercise shared transatlantic 
leadership to ensure that the vision of their past 
leaders can be preserved, updated, and carried 
forward into the 21st century with all the challenges 
it brings  What do Europe and the United States 
need to do to meet this challenge?
First, they need to commit to not give up on the 
multilateral economic institutions, but to reform 
them instead  Together, the United States and 
Europe created these multilateral institutions and 
they have as much to gain as ever in keeping them 
at the core of the global economic architecture  
However, ensuring that these institutions remain 
relevant, legitimate, and effective will mean some 
significant changes in the manner in which both 
the United States and Europe participate in their 
operations  These changes are an opportunity to 
show real leadership on the world stage at the cost 
of some concessions in the formal power structure  
Agreeing to make these concessions would also 
send a powerful signal to the rest of the world 
that they can have faith that these institutions are 
changing to accommodate shifting relationships 
in the global economy and an equally powerful 
affirmation by the transatlantic powers of their 
continuing reliance on multilateral institutions  
For its part, the United States should give up on 
both the unwritten rule that the head of the World 
Bank must be an American and the insistence 
that it retain veto power over matters requiring 
a supermajority  In addition, the United States 
should support the use of the G20 as a strategic 
steering group or “Council of Governors” for the 
World Bank, IMF, and WTO to ensure a strong 
G20 role in strategy formulation and coordination 
that would also give greater voice to the emerging 
market economies  
In the same vein, the member states of the 
European Union should give up on the unwritten 
rule that the head of the IMF must be a European, 
and work to consolidate European votes and seats 
at the IMF and World Bank either into a single 
European seat (which would give Europe the 
single largest voting share) or at least consolidate 
its seven partial seats with the bigger European 
economies so that Europe ends up with no 
more than four seats  As with the United States, 
the European Union and its member states 
should also lend their support to the G20 as the 
“steering committee of the global economy ”
For Europe, the form of European participation 
in the Bretton Woods institutions presents a 
challenge and an opportunity to resolve the best 
way to ensure the strongest collective European 
voice in global economic governance  The coming 
into force of the Lisbon Treaty gives the European 
Union a formal international legal personality, 
and all around the world the EU is reorganizing its 
representation, a process that will continue with the 
Transatlantic Multilateralism 
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formation of the External Action Service  A reform 
of the governance structure of the international 
economic institutions would give Europe another 
opportunity to put this new status into operation  
Today, at the WTO, Europe speaks with one voice, 
through sole representation by the European 
Commission  The opposite is the case at the Bretton 
Woods institutions, where the European Union 
has no formal place and can only act through 
the voice of certain member states  Nor does 
the Eurozone have a formal place at the IMF  At 
the G20, the European Union and the European 
Commission have been present—but so, too, have 
been individual member states (France, Germany, 
Italy, and the United Kingdom, later joined by 
Spain and the Netherlands), with some of these 
member states overshadowing the European Union  
Reforming the manner of European participation 
in the Bretton Woods institutions could be a win-
win for Europe  It would allow Europe to show 
leadership and a commitment to the modernization 
of the multilateral institutions while at the same 
time consolidating European power in a single 
but larger voting share  But it will not be easy  The 
three member states with permanent seats—France, 
Germany, and the United Kingdom—will no doubt 
resist giving up their exclusive rights  Many of the 
issues related to financial regulation and reform are 
still carried out at the national level, even within 
Europe and within the Eurozone  However, the 
opportunity to obtain more influence by acting 
collectively in this one arena of international 
economic institutional governance ought to be 
compelling for Europe  These institutions do not 
raise the same political problems of European 
consolidation that would be present at the UN or 
in other fora  Participating as one Europe could be 
seen as furtherance of the process of a coordinated 
European approach that was begun in preparation 
for the G20 Leaders Summits and of the Lisbon 
Treaty’s goal of making the European voice in the 
world stronger  
Nonetheless, on paper, all of this could be seen as a 
dramatic loss of power on both sides of the Atlantic  
But as a practical matter, a diminution in sway over 
the institutions of global economic governance 
could result in longer-term gains that would stem 
from stronger, more legitimate, and more effective 
institutions that operate to the continuing benefit 
of the United States and Europe and the kind of 
stable, open, rules-based global economy they both 
support  If the process and criteria for selecting 
the heads of the IMF and World Bank were solely 
merit-based, and if the United States and European 
Union nominated highly-qualified candidates, they 
would likely continue to take their turn in having 
their nationals serve in leadership roles  Moreover, 
while the exact voting share of countries is an 
important symbol of their power, few if any formal 
votes are taken in practice  In the process of finding 
sufficient support for any given proposal short of 
a formal vote, the consolidation of Europe into a 
single voice may result in more, not less, influence  
Moreover, some diminution in the voting share 
of the United States or Europe would still leave 
both powers with the ability to block objectionable 
changes simply by finding a small handful of other 
countries to join them 
At the WTO, the concerns over and need for 
transatlantic leadership are somewhat different, 
while the challenges of effectiveness, legitimacy, 
and relevance are the same  Unlike the IMF and the 
World Bank, the WTO does not have an executive 
board or a management board, nor does the WTO 
Secretariat have the power to set priorities or 
propose new rules or formal structures to approve 
new rules other than through consensus—and 
traditionally only through rounds of negotiations  
This means that the WTO does not need to engage 
in any formal rebalancing—certainly not in the 
direction of a further devolution or redistribution 
of power  However, the WTO membership does 
need to form new alliances and groups that would 
create the basis for decision-making in the absence 
of complete consensus  It is in putting together 
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these alliances that the United States and the 
European Union should play a leadership role 
by taking seriously the recommendations of the 
Sutherland Report, the Warwick Commission, and 
other contributions to put in place alternatives to 
the single undertaking—an “all-for-one and one-
for-all” consensus only process  U S  and European 
leaders should ensure that a serious debate about 
the WTO’s governance structure and its place in the 
global economic architecture takes place now, while 
leaders from around the world are focused on all 
three pillars of the system and should make it clear 
that this examination can be conducted without 
detriment to the ongoing attempts to conclude the 
Doha Round negotiations—and in fact could even 
contribute to their successful conclusion  This is the 
moment for the WTO to take its rightful place as an 
equal partner with the IMF and the World Bank in 
the global economic system 
Second, the United States and Europe should use 
the G20 as the most efficient mechanism to insert 
high-level involvement in the governance of these 
institutions, particularly their strategic direction 
setting and the coherence among them  They need 
to ensure that the mandates of these institutions 
are modernized to cover the many issues that are 
currently going unaddressed—including food 
security, energy policy, climate change, competition 
policy, and corruption—while protecting against 
duplication among them  They also must take 
seriously the commitment to allow their own 
macroeconomic policies to be subject to real 
scrutiny by the G20 and the IMF for consistency 
with the G20 Framework for Strong, Sustainable, 
and Balanced Growth  Moreover, both the United 
States and the EU need to take seriously the 
proposals for reform of these institutions and to 
stick with the reform process until the necessary 
renovations of the institutions are completed 
Third, the United States and the European 
Union should reaffirm their commitment to 
multilateralism by working to multilateralize the 
tangle of their own regional agreements and to 
adopt a set of guidelines for any further agreements 
that ensure that they do not detract from or 
undermine the multilateral system 18 As in many 
other areas, the European Union and the United 
States have been at the forefront of regionalism  The 
European Union itself is a regional agreement—
the largest economic free trade area in the world, 
followed by the North American Free Trade 
Agreement, linking the United States, Canada, 
and Mexico  Given their leadership roles in both 
multilateral and regional growth, the United 
States and Europe should also lead the way in 
finding a way to multilateralize these agreements, 
particularly the agreements they each have in 
common with other countries, in a manner which 
brings them closer to multilateralism  Currently, 
the United States and the EU remain each other’s 
largest trading partners—far exceeding their trade 
with any other country  For example, U S  two-way 
trade in goods with the EU totaled $988 billion in 
2009, while its two-way trade with China was $366 
billion  However, high on the list of significant 
trading partners for both the US and the EU are 
a number of countries with whom both have 
negotiated a free trade agreement, most notably 
Canada (the United States’ second largest partner 
and Europe’s fifth), South Korea (the sixth largest 
trading partner for both the United States and the 
EU) and Mexico (the fourth largest partner for 
the United States and tenth for the EU)  If these 
common agreements alone could be reshaped into 
multilateral agreements, the United States and the 
EU will have done much to bring a substantial 
amount of trade back into the multilateral fold 
18 The concept of “multilaterlizing” regional agreements 
has been much discussed in academic and other forums, 
including at the September 10-12 2007, conference at the 
WTO, “Multilateralizing Regionalism: Challenges for the 
Global Trading System ” See in particular, Richard Baldwin’s 
“Multilateralising Regionalism: Spaghetti Bowl as Building 
Blocks on the Path to Global Free Trade,” The World Economy 
29 (2006) 
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The most important contribution to be made is 
to agree upon principles to guide such efforts as 
a way of distinguishing those agreements that are 
acceptable within a multilateral system and those 
that are not  “Acceptable” agreements would include 
those that:
• Do not create conflicts with members’ 
obligations under multilateral agreements, 
such as the WTO Agreement or the IMF’s 
Articles of Agreement 
• Are at least as transparent as multilateral 
agreements 
• Require full disclosure of all the details to 
the multilateral institutions and subject the 
regional agreement to potential assessment 
by the relevant multilateral institution for 
significant inconsistencies with multilateral 
obligations 
With respect to trade agreements, much work 
has already been done in many forums on the 
specifics of harmonizing rules of origin, or 
providing opportunities to cumulate inputs into the 
manufacture of goods, resolving conflicts between 
dispute settlement provisions, mutually recognizing 
regulatory approvals and more 19 The European 
Union and the United States need to agree to 
undertake this work now in order to show others 
that their own regional agreements can put them on 
the path to greater multilateral integration 
19 See Richard Baldwin and Patrick Low, Multilateralizing 
Regionalism  Antoni Estevadeordal and Kati Suominen 
“Bridging Regional Trade Agreements in the Americas,” Special 
Report on Integration and Trade, Inter-American Development 
Bank 
Figure 2. U.S. and EU Free Trade Agreements
U.S. Free Trade Agreements EU Free Trade Agreements
Source: USTR
The United States has signed free trade agreements (FTAs) with 
Colombia, Korea, and Panama, but Congress must enact legislation 
to approve and implement each agreement in order for them to go 
into effect.
Source: EU Trade-European Commission (Jan. 11, 2010) 
1Both the United States and the EU are in the process of 
negotiating an agreement with India.
2The United States and Canada have an FTA in effect. The EC and 
Canada negotiated a common working document in Dec. 2009; 
final confirmation of an FTA is pending further consultation.
3While the U.S. has already signed a free trade agreement with 
Korea, Congress has yet to enact legislation to approve it. The EC’s 
FTA with Korea was initialed in Oct. 2009. The text of the FTA must 
be translated into all EU languages before the ratification process 
can proceed. 
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The way forward—for the international community 
as a whole, and for the transatlantic partners 
in particular—is now clear  To cope with the 
increasing complexity of world affairs, in which the 
challenges themselves are growing more difficult 
and reaching agreement among the large number of 
players is ever more like a huge multidimensional 
chess game, the institutions of global economic 
governance are in urgent need of renovation  The 
status quo is not an option—let alone the status quo 
ante, before the economic crisis struck  Failure to 
modernize the international economic institutions 
in all likelihood will mean watching them atrophy 
and decay  The end result would be even greater 
fragmentation of global economic governance 
into a patchwork of overlapping, competing, and 
conflicting regional and bilateral arrangements 
that would reduce the ability of both individual 
countries and the international community as 
a whole to act and to find solutions to the most 
urgent problems of the day 
This need not be the case  In spite of Copenhagen, 
in spite of the eight years of crisis and stalemate 
in the Doha Round negotiations, in spite of 
proliferating regionalism, it is still possible to save 
multilateralism and to preserve the architecture 
that has served the international community well  
Reforms can be made to our existing institutions 
that both preserve the strong role and voice of 
the United States and European Union while 
simultaneously encouraging stronger participation 
and commitment from the emerging market 
countries  By acting responsibly and showing 
leadership in the redistribution of power, giving 
emerging market countries more say over the 
strategic direction of the existing global economic 
institutions, the United States and Europe can lead 
the way in preserving and extending the benefits 
of the multilateral economic order they created  
By working with the emerging market countries 
through the mechanism of the G20 Leaders 
Summit, they can provide a “Council of Governors” 
for the global economic institutions  In this 
manner, the United States and the European Union 
can continue to provide the kind of stewardship 
and direction of the global economy they showed 
in the second half of the 20th century and that is so 
sorely needed amid the increasing complexities and 
growing challenges of the 21st  
Conclusion12
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